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FROM PEACE THROUGH FREE TRADE TO INTERVENTIONISM FOR THE 
PEACE : THE DEVELOPMENT OF J.M. KEYNES’ THOUGHT 
 FROM THE FIRST TO THE SECOND WORLD WAR  
 
Alain Alcouffe* et Fanny Coulomb** 
 
The link between Keynes and the economy of war is rather paradoxical. On the one 
hand Keynes played a significant role in his country's war effort during the two 
world conflicts and recognized the stimulus on growth induced by European 
rearmament, on the other hand, his inclination towards different dimensions of 
pacifism manifested itself on many occasions in his life, as in the conclusion of the 
General Theory, which ends with hope that the envisaged reforms of capitalism 
will lead to a world without war. We propose to show that Keynes, even if he has 
not developed a true economic theory of war and peace, was nevertheless 
constantly concerned to promote solutions. 
The expression "military Keynesianism", which was widely used during the US-
Soviet arms race, helped to raise suspicions of Keynes' sympathy for rearmament 
or war as privileged economic stimulus, or even for authoritarian regimes. His 
hostility to trade liberalism in times of crisis also fostered the image of a Keynes 
who was a proponent of economic nationalism, the latter often paired with the 
praise of militarism, as illustrated by the case of Friedrich List in his National 
System of Political Economy (1840). 
A reading of Keynes’ writings can however undermine these assumptions. Indeed, 
pacifism has clearly marked his thinking and his concern to resolve the economic 
crisis is directly linked to his hostility to war, which he considers nevertheless 
inevitable in the absence of a return to prosperity. 
 
 
After presenting the asserted pacifism of young Keynes (part I), we will explain 
that his thinking of the 1920s is marked by a radical critique of the spirit of revenge 
and the call for international cooperation (Part II). Finally, we will show how, in 
the 1930s, when the economic crisis is prolonged and rearmament accelerated, he 
will propose an original economic theory, in breach with liberalism, whose validity 
can be tested by the increase in European military expenditure (Part III). 
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I - FROM THE WAR OF THE BOERS TO THE FIRST WORLD WAR: A 
STATED PACIFISM 
The young Keynes is marked by the liberal thought and pacifism, which was 
widely spread among economists at the beginning of the 20th century1. Close to 
conscientious objectors, he is in accordance with the ideas developed by the future 
Nobel Peace Prize winner Norman Angell, who calls for European disarmament. 
 
Hostility to Recruitment and Militarism 
 
It was during the Second Boer War (October 1899-May 1902) that Keynes, 
who had been studying at Eton College since September 1897, was confronted 
directly with the war2. Indeed, at the beginning of the year 1900, the directors of 
the college informed the students that it was their duty to join the ranks of the 
volunteers3. Keynes asks his parents for advice and, faced with their lack of 
enthusiasm, decides to stay away, exposing in a letter to his parents his lucidity 
about the patriotic outbursts:  
« About the volunteers—I have not joined .. . I think that without your letter 
which amounted to a refusal I should have been compelled to be engulfed in this 
marvellous martial ardour that has seized the school. Some say that patriotism 
requires one to join the useless Eton shooters, but it seems to me to be the sort 
of patriotism that requires one to wave the Union Jack. » (ibidem).  
These reservations of a very young man towards the recruitment do not necessarily 
translate a conviction pacifist but four years later he reaffirms, in his essay on 
Burke: « there is a certain minimum of personal freedom which should never be 
infringed » .4 
This hostility to the recruitment is reflected in his memoir My early beliefs where 
he writes that he and his friends believe «  in a continuing moral progress by virtue 
of which the human race already consists of reliable, rational, decent people, 
influenced by truth and objective standards, who can be safely released from the 
outward restraints of convention and traditional standards and inflexible rules of 
conduct, and left, from now onwards, to their own sensible devices, pure motives 
                                                          
1
 Coulomb F., Hartley K., Intriligator M.D. (2008), ‘Pacifism in the economic analysis : a historical 
perspective’, Defence and Peace Economics, Fall.  
2
 Gilles Dostaler, 2005, Keynes et ses combats, Paris, Albin Michel. 
3
 Dostaler, op.cit., p. 233. 
4
Cite par Markwell Donald (2006), John Maynard Keynes and International Relations: Economic 
Paths to War and Peace, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, p.32. 
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and reliable intuitions of the good. ».5 and is found in the letter he sent to the 
tribunal in February 28, 1916, for the recognition of his conscientious objection : 
« I claim complete exemption because I have a conscientious objection to 
surrendering my liberty of judgement on so vital a question as undertaking 
military service. I do not say that there are not conceivable grounds on which I 
should voluntarily offer myself for military service. But having regard to the 
actually existing circumstances, I am certain that it is not my duty to so offer 
myself, and I solemnly assert to the Tribunal that my objection to submit to 
authority in this matter is truly conscientious. I am not prepared on such an 
issue as this to surrender my right of decision, as to what is or is not my duty, to 
any other person, and I should think it morally wrong to do so. »6 
This document distances itself from a pacifism of principle since it admits 
circumstances in which he could engage in war. The positions he asserts are no 
doubt the result of multiple influences, but the hesitations to conscientious 
objection show his concern not to be cut off from his pacifist friends. In fact, as 
soon as the war broke out, Keynes put his talents at the service of the finances of 
his country, as shown in his September 1914 article in the Economic Journal7, then 
in his analyzes of German finances (1915) and his activities at the Treasury, which 
suffice to exempt him from conscription. In fact there is a coherence between 
Keynes's positions in his works devoted to the First World War, as shown in 
particular in his article on the German war economy. Keynes, editor of the 
Economic Journal, published reviews of German economic literature. The 
publication in December 1914, January and March 1915 of special issues of the 
journal Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik devoted to the economic 
analysis of war could not escape him. He first analyzes the articles dealing with 
financial problems and notes the analogies with the situation in the United 
Kingdom, which he studied in his September article:  
« The state of credit in Germany during the first two or three weeks of war 
seems to have resembled that which we experienced here much more closely 
than we have known hitherto. ». This issue also contains an article by Professor 
Brentano on the war and on the avoidance of its recurrence. Professor 
Brentano bases his hopes on the internationalisation of the sea and of the 
establishment in the future of such union between civilised peoples as may make 
impossible the recurrence of such misfortunes as those which the world now 
suffers. » 
                                                          
5
 Collected writings, vol. 10, p.447. 
6
 Collected writings, vol. 16, p.178. 
7
  “War and the Financial System”, August, The Economic Journal, Vol. 24, No. 95 (Sep., 1914), pp. 
460-486 
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Keynes also reports an article by E. Bernstein on the failure of the general strike to 
oppose the war. He explains in detail how the German Social-Democracy found 
itself trapped by the chain of events by which each country could consider that it 
was a defensive war for him and Keynes takes advantage of it to attack all the 
warmongers:   
« It is the horrible paradox of war and the perpetual scourge of peace parties in 
all countries, that when once war is joined it is for all nations a war of defence-
a scourge of which those who, I will not say love war, but hate lovers of peace, 
do not spare the use. » 
On the other hand, he is pleased with Bernstein's manifestation of an undiminished 
love of internationalism and international amity, which he contrasts with an article 
by Edgar Jaffe (March, 1915) on the militarization of economic life. This is an 
opportunity for Keynes to denounce the ‘German myth’, shared by a minority of 
the German population, which recommends economic isolationism, ‘permanent 
war’ (and thus economic militarization), and the refusal of individualism, with a 
regulation system based on the State apparatus, aiming at an increasing 
effectiveness rather than human welfare. On this point he speaks of an ‘hideous 
doctrine’8.  
However, according to him, such theories are largely minority among German 
economists.  
« What is the general impression produced on the mind of an English reader of 
these Kriegshefte? Principally, I think, that Germany and Germans are not so 
different from the rest of the world as our daily Press would hypnotise us into 
believing. The German myth, which is currently offered for our belief, is of a 
superhuman machine driven by inhuman hands. The machine is a good one, but 
has by no means moved with such uncanny smoothness, as we come too easily 
to believe when it is hidden from us by a curtain of silence. Nor are the drivers, 
after all, so changed from what before the war we used to think them. In spite of 
Professor Jaffe, the general note is of moderation, sobriety, accuracy, 
reasonableness, and truth. » 
This respectful analysis of the German economists must be compared with the 
recommendations contained in the letter to the Times of A. Marshall of August 22, 
1914, in which, if the latter accepted the idea of a defensive war in view of the 
risks to England posed by the installation of the Germans in Antwerp, he asserted 
his esteem for the German people (exceptionally conscientious and upright, 
sensitive to the calls of duty, tender in their family affections, true and trusty in 
friendship) . « It is therefore our interest as well as our duty to respect them and 
                                                          
8
 “The Economics of War in Germany”,  The Economic Journal, Vol. 25, No. 99 (September 1915), 
pp. 443-452. 
       Keynes, from peace through free trade to interventionism for the peace                        5      
 
make clear that we desire their friendship, but yet to fight them with all our 
might. »9.  
This letter from Marshall provoked strong criticism. In a period of patriotic 
excitement, Marshall's love for Germany was taken as a provocation and unleashed 
anger against him.   
 
The influence of Norman Angell's active pacifism 
 
The peaceful liberal movement was very active on the eve of the First World War, 
especially in Great Britain. Thus, in 1910, in a real best-seller, The Great Illusion, a 
revised edition of a 1903 book, the British economist Norman Angell10 asks 
governments to realize that the time for wars is over and to proceed to 
disarmament. Over and above strictly economic considerations, Angell portrays the 
progress of civilization as bringing about a reduction in the psychological influence 
of physical force, and human combativity tending more and more to transfer to the 
intellectual level. Thus, intellectual strength would gradually replace physical 
force, including at the level of the army, whose effectiveness increasingly depends 
on engineers and technicians11. Psychological progress must also lead to collective 
accountability, awareness of the need to renounce the use of physical force 
between states, thereby destroying the "homogeneous personality of States." 12 
Denouncing the international arms race13, The idea that "the prosperity of nations 
depends on their political power, from which flows the necessity of protecting 
themselves against the aggression of other nations, desirous of diminishing our 
power to their advantage" is a “Gross and dangerous mis-conception", an 
"illusion"14. He wants to show that “no other nation could gain any advantage from 
the conquest of the British colonies, and Great Britain could not suffer material 
damage by their loss ..." 15. 
                                                          
9
 Lettre 1027, Marshall, A., & Whitaker, J. K. (1996). The Correspondence of Alfred Marshall, 
Economist Volume 3. Volume 3. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.. Keynes rappellera cette 
position de Marshall vis-à-vis de l’Allemagne dans sa biographie de Marshall ()Keynes, J. M., & 
Johnson, E. S. (1972). The collected writings of John Maynard Keynes. Volume X,Essays in 
Biography. London, Macmillan. 
10
 Norman Angell (1910), La grande illusion, Hachette et Cie, Paris. 
11
 Ibid., pp. 210-243. 
12
 Ibid., p. 244. 
13
 Ibid., pp. 274-300. 
14
 Ibid., p. xv. 
15
 Ibid., p. 93. 
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He also opposes the idea that a nation can be enriched by war, since the war 
indemnity itself fails to cover all the costs generated by the conflict and its 
preparation16. 
On this point, Angell expresses ideas as early as 1910 which will be found in 
Keynes’ The Economic Consequences of Peace (ECP). According to Angell, it is 
useless to impose a war indemnity, which could only be paid by exports to the 
recipient country, causing a social crisis due to the "dumping" represented by these 
devalued foreign products. The negative effect of the receipt by Germany of the 
payment by France of 225 billion gold marks at the end of the war of 1870-71 is an 
illustration of the undesirable nature of the reparations. 
Keynes endorsed Angell's ideas, and even invited him to speak at the Political 
Economy Club in February 191217. 
Norman Angell will consider in 192118 that the Keynesian criticism of the Treaty of 
Versailles in ECP validates his theory of 1910 on war indemnities as detrimental to 
the basic interests of the victorious countries. He admitted, however, an error in his 
book The Great Illusion: the claim that international economic interdependencies 
would prevent the occurrence of prolonged hostilities because of the risk of 
economic collapse. However, Germany had been able to endure four years of 
economic isolation and blockade without collapsing. But according to Angell, the 
German economy would not have resisted beyond this, in the absence of a declared 
conflict19. 
Keynes warmly welcomed Angell's book of 1921, calling it (according to Angell) 
"extremely good"20. Keynes also supported Angell in 1931 when he successfully 
applied for the Nobel Peace Prize. 
However, as we shall see later, Keynes later departed from the pacifism of the left, 
considered as too wait-and-see, of which Angell was one of the representatives. 
 
 
 
                                                          
16
 Ibid., pp. 77-92. 
17
 Turnell Sean (2002), Keynes, economics and war, Macquarie Economics Research Papers, 7, 
Sydney.  
18
 Norman Angell (1921), The fruits of victory 
19
 Williams Andrew J. Failed Imagination?: New World Orders of the Twentieth Century, Failed 
Imagination? Anglo - American New World Orders from Wilson to Bush, Manchester University 
Press, 1997 and 2007. 
 
20
 Op.cit. 
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II- THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE : AN ADVOCACY 
AGAINST REVANCHISM AND FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
SOLIDARITY 
 
Keynes became advisor at the British Treasury in 1915 and was then directly 
interested in the question of war finance. He vainly opposed the option of total war 
for Great Britain, even being on the brink of resigning from the Treasury when the 
British government called for conscription. 
After the German capitulation, his book The Economic Consequences of the 
Peace (ECP) published in 1919 had a great impact, as a major criticism of the 
conditions of the Treaty of Versailles. Keynes then plays a central role in the 
debate on the economic future of Germany and calls for international cooperation. 
 
 Keynes and the Ashley report (1916) 
 
Keynes is not as hostile as Angel to the principle of war indemnities. In the 
spring of 1916 the English Government was concerned about the effects on the 
English economy of an indemnity paid by the defeated country21. It was finally 
William Ashley who was asked to write a report on this subject. Ashley then asks 
the assistance of Keynes, who accepts in June. At the instigation of Ashley is 
translated a note of Adolph Wagner imputing the difficulties of Germany after the 
War of 1870 to the indemnity paid by France. Finally, after a few shuttles, the 
report was delivered by its two authors on 2 January 191722. The memorandum 
states that the payment of an indemnity generally has negative effects on the 
economy that pays it and positive ones for the recipient economy. The 
memorandum estimates that the effect of the indemnities paid by France from 1871 
was at first positive for the German economy but was then cancelled out by the 
speculation that followed. In particular, the report rejects the idea that the 
indemnity stimulates the trade of the defeated country and is an obstacle to the 
exports of the winners. The report does not, therefore, exclude the idea of 
reparations, and in in that regard it constitutes a disavowal of the positions 
expressed by Angell before the war. 
The Ashley report, however, questions Germany's ability to pay and advocates 
moderation in the demands of the victorious allies. Keynes was to return to this 
                                                          
21
 Le détail de la préparation du Memorandum se trouve dans Markwell Donald (2006), John 
Maynard Keynes and International Relations: Economic Paths to War and Peace, Oxford & New 
York: Oxford University Press. (pp. 55-58), Voir aussi W. Barber Barber W. J. (1991), ‘Attempts to 
comprehend the nature of war, 1910-20’, in Goodwin C.D. (ed), Economics and national security, 
History of Political Economy, annual supplement, 23, Duke University Press, 75-76.. 
22
 Activities, 1914-1919, (London, MacMillan, 1971, pp. 311-330) 
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question at the end of 191823. He sets out as the starting point for negotiation a total 
income paid by Germany (reparations and others) not exceeding 3 billion pounds : 
an effective payment of 2 billion, if paid without adverse consequences, was 
considered as being very satisfactory in all cases.  
 
The criticism of war indemnities The Economic Consequences of the Peace  
 
The criticism of the reparations imposed on Germany by the Treaty of 
Versailles, developed in ECP (1919) 24, has remained famous. Keynes went so far 
as to leave the British Treasury to protest against the reparations, and he militated 
firmly for a revision of the treaty and even for a cancellation of all reparations. He 
talks in ECP of a "Carthaginian peace", leading to the destruction of Germany, 
which if forced to pay the expected amount of reparations will plunge definitively 
into the crisis and even famine. And then the reaction can be terrible. Keynes 
considers that the economic collapse would exacerbate the risk of a workers' 
revolution in Germany, making the spread of Bolshevism in that country and its 
strengthening in Russia likely. But he also evokes another scenario, that of an 
authoritarian reaction, with the setting up of a regime having the ambition to 
dominate Europe25. In 1921 he reaffirmed that, in Germany, the economic 
weakening added to the political humiliation of the Treaty of Versailles could lead 
to a power takeover by the military26. The Allies must be wary of an "authoritarian 
reaction" as much as of Bolshevism, as it could lead to a world war. 
On this issue, he was much criticized by American economists, but even more 
by French economists, notably for his condemnation of the French plan of the 
occupation of the Ruhr (the French government considering that Germany was 
voluntarily escaping its payment obligations). In ECP, Keynes is himself very 
critical of the French demands and the intransigent position of Clemenceau27. His 
opinion is that the French are not aware of the disastrous economic implications of 
reparations for the whole of Europe. He regretted in 1930 that economic science 
was not sufficiently disseminated in French academic and official circles28. In ECP 
                                                          
23
 Memorandum by the Treasury on the Indemnity Payable by the Enemy Power for Reparation and 
Other Claims (2 december  1918) (Activities, 358-378). 
24
 The Econmic Consequences of the Peace (1919), in the Collected writings of John Maynarad 
Keynes edited by D. Moggridge, vol II, Macmillan, St Martin’s Press.  
25
 ECP, chapter VII 
26
 The Manchester Guardian, 26/27 April 1921, Volume 17 p 230. 
27
 ECP, chapitre II. 
28
 The Macmillan Committee, Committee on Finance and Industry, 7 March 1930, Volume 20 p 154. 
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(1919), he wrote that the main issue is not whether the reparations are morally 
justified : only economic pragmatism should influence the political choices of 
Allied governments. And precisely, Keynes puts forward the argument of 
international economic interdependencies: the political measures aimed at 
weakening the German economic potential are short-sighted, as an economic 
recession in Germany would spread to the rest of Europe. Since Germany was the 
economic heart of Europe before the war, its economic collapse would directly 
destabilize several Central European countries, which need a strong German 
economy29. 
To explain the problems with the Treaty of Versailles, Keynes seeks to prove 
that Germany does not have the capacity to pay. After presenting the three forms of 
payment of reparations by Germany (transfers of wealth in the form of gold or 
foreign securities, value of ownership of the ceded territories, annual payments 
partly in cash and partly in goods such as coal, potash and dyes), he writes :  
«  It is evident that Germany's pre-war capacity to pay an annual foreign tribute 
has not been unaffected by the almost total loss of her colonies, her overseas 
connections, her mercantile marine, and her foreign properties, by the cession 
of ten per cent of her territory and population, of one-third of her coal and of 
three-quarters of her iron ore, by two million casualties amongst men in the 
prime of life, by the starvation of her people for four years, by the burden of a 
vast war debt, by the depreciation of her currency to less than one-seventh its 
former value, by the disruption of her allies and their territories, by Revolution 
at home and Bolshevism on her borders, and by all the unmeasured ruin in 
strength and hope of four years of all-swallowing war and final defeat. All this, 
one would have supposed, is evident. Yet most estimates of a great indemnity 
from Germany depend on the assumption that she is in a position to conduct in 
the future a vastly greater trade than ever she has had in the past. »30 
He is particularly worried about the risk of inflation in Europe, which can 
undermine the very foundations of capitalism, preparing for a social revolution : 
« Lenin was certainly right. There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning 
the existing basis of society than to debauch the currency. (…)  The profiteers 
are a consequence and not a cause of rising prices. By combining a popular 
hatred of the class of entrepreneurs with the blow already given to social 
security by the violent and arbitrary disturbance of contract and of the 
established equilibrium of wealth which is the inevitable result of inflation, 
these Governments are fast rendering impossible a continuance of the social 
                                                          
29
 ECP, 145. 
30
 ECP, chapter V. 
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and economic order of the nineteenth century. But they have no plan for 
replacing it. »31 
Describing the trade imbalances of France and Italy, as well as the disastrous 
budgetary situation of these two countries, coupled with a galloping inflation, he 
explains that a weakening of Germany would have an aggravating effect on all 
European economy32.  
As early as 1918 Keynes had pointed out the possible perverse effects of 
reparations, which could force Germany to expand its exports, thus worsening 
international economic competition. Reparations must therefore only absorb the 
normal German trade surplus, which could have been spent on foreign investment 
and exports33.  
In 1920, returning to the question of reparations, he added that it was not justified 
to hold Germany solely responsible for the war, what was encapsulated within the 
idea of "reparations". He reproached the injustice of the Treaty of Versailles and its 
lack of respectability, for it did not respect the fourteen points of Wilson (the basis 
on which the Germans accepted peace) refusing to pay punitive damages. On this 
point (already discussed in the first chapter of the ECP), he denounced Wilson's 
incomprehensible turn, which first had "the words of a philosopher," and then 
submitted to the "reality of power ". "On some subjects, we have not kept faith. He 
recalls that there are eternal reasons for man to keep his promises and calls for a 
"crusade for the inviolability of international commitments"34.  
 
 
 
 
Poor reception of Keynes ideas in France 
 
In France, the positions of a Keynes judged "Germanophile" arouse much 
indignation. After the First World War, France's economy was very weak and the 
idea that "Germany will pay" was dominant. 
Many French economists support the Treaty of Versailles. For Biard d'Aunet35, 
the reparations are too weak, in view of the "complicity of the German nation", 
                                                          
31
 ECP, chapter VI. 
32
 ECP, chapter VI. 
33
 Memorandum by the Treasury on the Indemnity Payable by the Ennemy Powers for Reparation 
and other Claims, 1918, Volume 16 p 380. 
34
 Everybody's Magazine, September 1920, Volume 17 p 51. 
35
 Biard d’Aunet (1923), Le règlement des réparations, Revue d’Economie Internationale, pp. 4-40. 
       Keynes, from peace through free trade to interventionism for the peace                        11      
 
whose character is warlike and democratic aspirations uncertain. Blondel36 shares 
this point of view. André Tardieu (1921, 16), Clemenceau's advisor to the Treaty of 
Versailles and future President of the Council, expressed his fear of the future 
consequences of the aggressiveness of the German people, considering that in 
Germany, "university intellectuals" provide the “philosophical justification of a 
war of rapine ". He is directly opposed to Keynes's argument about the political 
risks of too high reparations: "You say that there is a risk of provoking a 
nationalistic irritation in Germany. The German defeat already created this 
feeling. Hence the need to protect against a risk that will exist anyway. "37 
Germany’s banning from the international community is however disputed by 
some economists. As early as 1921, the French economist Charles Rist, strongly 
influenced by Keynes, emphasized the concrete difficulties of a practical 
implementation of some provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. Moreover, German 
payments to France were very low in the early post-war years, and in 1924 the 
Dawes Plan decided to suspend them until Germany's financial situation was 
restored. Charles Rist refused, however, to adhere to the pessimistic predictions of 
the British economist regarding the non-payment of reparations, and endeavoured 
to seek the practical means by which these payments could be made38.. Similarly, 
Yves Guyot39, editor-in-chief of the Journal des Economistes, calls for moderation 
in the demands of the victors, in order not to maintain the spirit of revenge among 
the defeated. However, he advocates the dismantling of the German Empire and of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a basis for future peace. Charles Gide40, on the 
other hand, criticizes the confiscation of Germany's colonies, what will penalize the 
restoration of its industry and encourage the country to conquer South American 
and Asian markets. 
For Jacques Rueff, on the other hand, in opposition to the principles of the 
Dawes plan and defender of the mechanism of an automatic balance of payments’ 
adjustment, there is no problem of transfer. Germany may secure the transfer by 
                                                          
36
 Georges Blondel (1920), La situations économique et financière de l’Allemagne, Revue 
Economique Internationale, pp. 443-460. 
37
 « Vous dites qu'on risque de provoquer en Allemagne une irritation nationaliste. La défaite 
allemande a créé déjà ce sentiment. D'où le besoin de se protéger contre un risque qui existera de 
toute façon. » Ibid, p. 445. 
— 38 See Alcouffe A. (1997), Keynes and the French guardians of the Say’s law, ESHET, 1st 
conference, Marseille et Coulomb F. (2000),  « Charles Rist, la revanche de l’économie sur l’esprit de 
revanche », in Dockès P. (dir.) : « Les traditions économiques françaises 1848-1939 », Editions du 
CNRS, Paris. 
39
 Yves Guyot (1921), L’année du Traité de Versailles, Journal des Economistes, pp. 3-27. 
40
 Charles Gide (1919), Le partage de l’Afrique et le traité de paix, Revue d’Economie Politique, pp. 
754-765. 
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obtaining foreign resources by means of an international loan, or, if it is not 
possible, by internal taxation or borrowing. In the latter two cases, "the resources 
obtained would be in national currency. To ensure its transfer, Germany would be 
obliged to seek foreign currency on all financial markets. The price of the German 
currency in relation to all other currencies would fall, apart from any measure of 
inflation and without any appreciable variation in its domestic purchasing power. 
Due to the positive disparity of the mark thus obtained, German exports would be 
stimulated, to the extent exactly necessary to supply the State with the foreign 
currencies it would need. In order to procure them, it would only have to buy them 
in German currency, from its exporters. "41 Later, Rueff will oppose the principle of 
the Dawes Plan of the limitation of transferable cash, which may be lower than the 
tax levy for reparations, in the event of the risk of monetary problems42. Rueff's 
argument, widely endorsed by French liberal economists, brings water to the 
supporters of the solution of "making Germany pay". 
 
Several years later, the controversy was revived by the Second World War, 
which naturally gave rise to many reflections on its causes. In his book against 
ECP published in 1946, "The calumniated peace or the Economic Consequences of 
Mr. Keynes"43, « La paix calomniée ou les Conséquences Economiques de M. 
Keynes » the French historian Etienne Mantoux accuses Keynes of having caused a 
polemic on the reparations which contributed to nourishing a feeling of injustice in 
Germany, creating the conditions of the Second World War. Meanwhile, Mantoux 
revisits the question of Germany's capacity to pay at the time of the Treaty of 
Versailles, believing that Keynes' forecasts of his possible economic collapse were 
unfounded. 
Keynes has never spoken beyond the 1920s on this issue, especially since his 
reflection radically evolved after the publication of the ECPs, which were based on 
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a liberal theoretical corpus. Thus, according to Turnell44 : « Keynes was in effect to 
repudiate much that he wrote on the links between economics and war in ECP. Of 
course, it is also true that the economics in ECP, and Keynes’s analysis of the 
transfer problem that he was convinced German reparations would impose, was 
based on an orthodoxy he would spend the rest of his life in trying to change”.  
As we shall see later, Keynes also distinguished himself in the late 1930s from 
the determined pacifism of a part of the radical European left.  
 
The call for international economic cooperation to restore economic 
prosperity 
 
In ECP Keynes asserts that an economist justifies his existence only if he 
participates in the elaboration of concrete solutions to improve the functioning of 
the liberal economy. It is therefore necessary to adopt a particular methodology, 
namely the observation of concrete problems as the basis of an original economic 
theory. He predicts the revolution in Europe if nothing is done to educate public 
opinion, whose hidden currents are ultimately more determinant for the survival of 
the system than the actions of politicians45. In 1923 he reaffirmed that war should 
be avoided as much as possible, not because it involves an economic cost, but 
because it is contrary to human nature46. However, adequate political and economic 
structures must be put in place. 
To better reconcile the imperatives of international peace and the defence of 
national economic interests, Keynes calls for international economic cooperation. 
In ECP, he links the issue of reparations to the question of interallied debt. The 
argument is that the danger of a debt crisis is weighing heavily on the world 
economy and is all the greater because, for the first time, the debt burden is not 
represented by "true capital" and is not "limited by the system of ownership". 
According to Keynes, the system of large-scale debt between governments is not 
natural, nor in accordance with human nature, and no people can long consent to 
work to fulfil a foreign payment47.  The cancellation of Allied debts would be a 
sign of solidarity between the Allies and would contribute to the establishment of a 
new Europe 48.  
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With the same concern for international co-operation, Keynes requested, as early as 
1919, financial assistance from the United States, in the form of an international 
loan, to help restart an European production penalized by trade deficit and by 
monetary disturbances49. At the 1919 Financial Conference in Amsterdam, he 
suggested the creation of a new international currency and settlements in the form 
of barter (compensation). He also proposes a free trade area in Europe to restore 
the economic efficiency destroyed by the innumerable new European borders and 
to promote peace50.  
Keynes' concern to find solutions to pacify international relations was 
reflected in all his foreign policy proposals. As early as 1921, apart from the 
cancellation of inter-allied debts51, he advocates disarmament, in the belief that 
national economic structures could benefit from the savings achieved by reducing 
military spending.52 It may be noted that the idea of a global disarmament to 
promote economic recovery was widespread in the aftermath of the war. Thus, the 
US Treasury, when it refuses to make a new loan to Europe in 1919, advocates 
disarmament, adequate taxation and domestic loans for the healing of the world. In 
the framework of the Subcommittee of the League of Nations for the Limitation of 
Armaments, Keynes proposes the limitation of military expenditure without 
success53.  
Finally, at the Genoa Conference for the Stabilization of International Trade in 
1922, he called for an international economic agreement. The maintenance of 
political risks in Europe necessitates this agreement, which must help to organize 
international relations in terms of peace, commercial freedom and economic 
wealth, so that "being a citizen of the European Society allows us to enjoy again 
the old individual liberties”54. 
Keynes adopted a liberal discourse at this period, implicitly linking world 
peace with the development of international trade regulated by international 
agreements that prevented protectionism and aggressive trade policies.  
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III – THE KEYNESIAN THOUGHT AS A RESULT OF A REFLECTION ON THE 
ECONOMIC STAKES OF WAR 
 
As Turnell55 recalled, Skidelsky56, who wrote a biography of Keynes, believed 
that Keynes had little competence in international relations, particularly because of 
his distance from the ruling circles of British foreign policy. Turnell contests this 
point of view, arguing that if Keynes had been able to launch a few "bad calls"57, 
his thought nevertheless evolved during the interwar period, following a thorough 
reflection on these subjects. Indeed, the "Keynesian revolution" has undoubtedly 
been largely fueled by empirical reflections on the causes of war and the conditions 
of world peace58. In Keynes's mind, the war, no matter how detestable, brings about 
new solutions of economic policy and international cooperation through 
international institutions.   
 
Advocating for the use of economic weapons as a means of preventing a world 
war 
 
During the 1930s, Keynes made several proposals for political cooperation for 
the defence of peace, convinced of the potential effectiveness of the economic 
weapon. In 1929 he participated in a Draft Convention for Financial Assistance by 
the League of Nations which proposed the future prevention of conflicts by the by 
means of the financial weapon. The prospect of financial support to one of the two 
belligerent parties in a potential conflict would deter the other party from starting 
hostilities59. A few years later, in 1935, he defended the principle of economic 
sanctions against Italy, refuting the argument that this country might declare war. 
For Keynes, such an act would not fall within a reasonable calculation60. Finally, in 
1937, he said that there were nine out of ten chances that the threat of sanctions 
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against Japan would have a positive effect61. More generally, he is confident in the 
effectiveness of economic sanctions: 
 "I am sure that the world greatly underestimates the effect of economic 
sanctions. "62 
In 1935 he proposed strengthening the League of Nations by limiting its 
membership to those countries that truly wished to make peace. He now thinks that 
it is too late to speak of disarmament, and that, on the contrary, the L.O.N. Must 
strengthen its economic and military power to be a deterrent to law-breakers. He 
deplores, with a biting irony, the impasse in this project, because of the refusal of 
the United States, the keystone of the system, to participate in it. 
 "However, we are told that it is an impossibility; The United States is too 
frightened by their ties with the outside world, they are too far from the fate of the 
rest of the world and even civilization to make the necessary commitments. "63 
Keynes does not believe that the confrontation between democracy and 
totalitarianism can be resolved by armed conflict. Convinced that the adherence of 
public opinion can only be achieved by adhering to a moral ideal embodied in 
particular by a new economic theory, he denounces the uselessness of a new "war 
of religions". 
"I consider with disgust the growing tendency to make the struggle between 
the two ideologies (or would it be conceded that there are three?) another War of 
Religion, to believe that the outcome can or will be determined by the strength of 
arms, and to think that it is our duty to make haste in all the corners of the world 
where those of our faith are oppressed. Let us suppose that the war is taking place, 
and suppose for argument that we win. And after ? (...) What are we going to do 
about the defeated? Are we going to impose on them our favorite ideology 
(whatever it is by then) in an up-to-date peace treaty, or do we assume that they 
will adopt it with spontaneous enthusiasm? (...) The defeat would be a complete 
disaster. Victory, as usual, would be useless, and probably pernicious. It is an 
illusion to believe that the conscience of guilt in the necessary murder can regulate 
what is primarily a moral issue. Therefore, and furthermore, I maintain that calls 
for peace are of the utmost urgency. "64 
A controversy subsequently emerged, with some critics of Keynes accusing 
him of having fostered sympathies for the Nazi regime, advancing the evocation of 
totalitarianism as a privileged regime to apply economic interventionism in the 
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preface to the German edition of the General Theory in 1936. Such an argument 
seems difficult to accept, as Keynes's pacifism and his attachment to democracy 
and individual freedoms are reflected in all his writings. In addition, the precise 
authorship of this preface is subject to caution65. Keynes strongly criticized the 
national autarchy policies of the 1930s, with the development of fascism, Nazism 
and communism. We have already mentioned his rejection of German economic 
nationalism in the 1910s (see Part I). In his 1933 article on national self-
sufficiency66, he explained that protectionism should be treated with caution; “For 
I must not be supposed to be endorsing all those things which are being done in the 
political world today in the name of economic nationalism. Far from it.” (1933: 
244).  
On the other hand, Markwell recalls that in the mid-1930s Keynes spoke of 
"brigand powers" about Germany, Italy and Japan.67 
 
Support for the rearmament of democracies 
 
In the interwar years, Keynes worked for peace and was reluctant until 1938 to 
recognize the war with Germany as inevitable. In 1937 he wrote :  
« I maintain that the claims for peace are paramount. It is our duty to prolong 
peace, hour by hour, day by day, for as long as we can. We do not know what 
the future will bring, except that it will be quite different from anything we 
could predict.”68  
However, his pacifism is not unlimited. As early as 1936, with the rise of military 
aggressions by the "brigand powers" and the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, he 
recognized the necessity of the rearmament of European democracies, with a 
dissuasive aim69. His health problems probably prevented him from multiplying the 
writings on this issue in 1937-1938. But on the eve of the Second World War he 
was opposed to the policy of the Socialists who were considering calling on people 
to refuse to fight, pay taxes or work in case of war. He will even accuse the liberal 
anti-war economists before World War I, including Angell, of having served the 
interests of their country by refusing to recognize the reality of a danger to national 
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security arising from the international situation and maintaining their calls for 
peace until the eve of the world conflict. 
A few months before the Munich Conference of September 29th, 1938, he opposed 
the wait-and-see policy of the Allied governments, and he advocated against the 
ineffective "negative pacifism" which Lloyd George and Chamberlain had hitherto 
opposed to Hitler, A "positive pacifism," which he said was the only bulwark 
against the "positive militarism" that characterized Germany. He proposed the 
creation of a new League of Nations, more responsible, with broad powers70. As for 
the Munich agreement between Chamberlain and Hitler, he wrote:  
« Neither the Prime Minister nor Herr Hitler ever intended for one moment that 
the play-acting should devolve into reality. »71 
All his writings leave little doubt as to his lucidity vis-à-vis the events of the period 
and his hostility to the strongly militarized undemocratic regimes. However, to the 
end, he will believe in the power of deterrence to avoid open conflict. For example, 
in 1938 he referred to the creation of a new "European Pact", which would be 
responsible for both the defence and the prevention of conflicts, through 
deterrence, and which would ensure the collective security of Europe by 
channelling forces in the direction of common action72. It would have three types of 
functions: financial assistance, blockade, a total military alliance. Deterrence is the 
main idea of the Pact. This institution would be mainly devoted to European 
problems; For the rest of the world, alongside a European League, similar 
institutions could be set up in America (the "American League"), the Pacific 
League, or the African League73. 
 
The rejection of liberal globalization 
 
The persistence of the economic crisis in Europe and the United States in the 
interwar years persuaded Keynes of the need to find other solutions to save the 
capitalist system from external challenge or internal destabilization. In 1934 he 
wrote that the inadequate economic policy measures taken in response to the 
economic crisis stemmed from a misunderstanding of economic mechanisms, still 
based on the same liberal theory as in the eighteenth century, which was henceforth 
unsuited to contemporary economic realities. Thus, the "standard system" of 
liberals and Marxists must be abandoned, with the establishment of a new 
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"scientific paradigm"74. State policy in the economic field is then presented as the 
main remedy against the crisis. Despite his closeness to the Liberals in linking 
peace and economic prosperity, Keynes no longer considers laissez-faire to 
guarantee either of these two goals, and advocates interventionist economic 
policies. 
In 1938 he strongly reaffirmed that economic theory, in the face of the temptation 
of totalitarian ideologies, which was harmful to world peace, must be 
fundamentally an instrument of defence for the liberal regime. The role of the 
economist is essential, at any rate likely to become decisive. 
« We are learning to honour more that formerly the achievements of our 
predecessors and the Christian civilisation and fundamental laws of conduct 
which they established in a savage world. We are seeing and enduring events, 
worse that which have not been seen and endured since man became himself. If 
we still recognise the difference, not merely between peace and war, but 
between good and evil, and between right and wrong, we need to rouse up and 
shake ourselves and offer leadership. »75  
 
In his famous article of 1933, National Self-sufficiency, Keynes recalls that he 
was raised in the conviction of the need for free trade:  
« I was brought up, like most Englishmen, to respect free trade not only as an 
economic doctrine which a rational and instructed person could not doubt, but 
almost as a part of the moral law. »76  
Indeed, in his early writings, Keynes firmly denounced protectionism. In 1910 he 
made a speech at the Cambridge Union against the reform of customs duties: 
"Protection is a flower which grows in rank soil. Free trade was a barrier to 
"internal corruption" generated by protectionism77. And in 1922 Keynes called on 
Great Britain to resist the wave of protectionism in Europe, dismissing the idea that 
it could solve the problem of unemployment78. 
But in 1933, Keynes's thinking on international trade evolved. According to him, 
the idea that economic liberalism is synonymous with international peace has not 
been validated by the facts. He accuses the search for maximum international 
specialization and international dissemination of capital to be responsible for 
aggressive national policies conducted in order to protect particular interests, 
conquer new markets and increase economic imperialism. He has doubts about the 
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economic benefits of an increased reliance on economic structures on foreign 
capital and external policies. He considers that capital flows (especially when the 
relationship between marginal efficiency of capital and interest rates is more 
advantageous abroad) impede the development of sound economic policies and he 
denounces the separation between ownership and management of firms. While 
reaffirming his pacifism, he proposed in 1933 a radical break with the orthodox 
model: 
« For these strong reasons, therefore, I am inclined to the belief that, after the 
transition is accomplished, a greater measure of national self-sufficiency and 
economic isolation between countries that existed in 1914 may tend to serve the 
cause of peace, rather than otherwise. At any rate, the age of economic 
internationalism was not particularly successful in avoiding war; and if its 
friends retort, that the imperfection of its success never gave it a fair chance, it 
is reasonable to point out that a greater success is scarcely probable in the 
coming years.»79  
 
 
The economic revival through European rearmament, a validation test 
for the General Theory 
 
Regarding military expenditure as a specific public expenditure, Keynes is 
aware of their possible effectiveness against unemployment80. The stimulation of 
economic activities linked to arms production should lead to an increase in 
employment and wages, which could lead to an increase in demand and hence in 
production. Assuming a 150 million pounds increase in military spending, Keynes 
concluded that this could help overcome unemployment, because of their multiplier 
effect:  
« If so, the direct effect of the armament expenditure may be to take 300,000 men 
of the dole. I fancy that even the pessimists would reckon that a fairly 
conservative figure. »81 
 However, the increase in armaments production is only a second-best solution, 
which does not meet social needs and which will slow down the productive 
potential of the economy in the long term. Military expenditures are the most 
unproductive (but useful for national defence) of public expenditures. Weapons are 
either stocked or destroyed in the event of war; therefore their production does not 
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represent an intertemporal transfer of purchasing power, but a definitive exclusion 
of the factors of production from the economic process. It is unproductive 
consumption. Preparation for war, more than the war itself, is a temporary 
incentive for economic activity. But Keynes disapproved of what is now known as 
"military Keynesianism," because it could only have short-term effects. It is better 
to direct public investment towards the building sector or civil engineering, which 
are socially useful. 
« I have a special extra reason for hoping that trade-unionists will do what they 
can to make this big transition to fuller employment work smoothly. I began by 
saying that the grand experiment has begun. If it works, if expenditure on 
armament really cure unemployment, I predict that we shall never go back all 
the way to the old state of affairs. I we can cure unemployment for the wasted 
purpose of armaments, we can cure it for the productive purposes of peace.»82 
The successes of German industry have in fact been observed by the European 
democratic countries since the mid-1930s. In 1938 Keynes explains this growth by 
the fact that the country makes full use of its production capacity and he advises 
Great Britain to refer to this example. He is in fact favourable to a flexible state 
planning83. But even if he rehabilitates interventionism, it does not mean that he 
favors a militarization of economic life. 
In fact, Keynes regrets that the only public expenditure of his time that helps 
to absorb unemployment is made in the military sector. Without the military 
spending, the British government would never have issued public loans. However, 
military expenditure’s effectiveness in overcoming the economic crisis can only be 
temporary. A policy based on other public spending would be more effective. 
Moreover, in 1942, in his analysis on the European economies after the 
Second World War, Keynes highlighted the lack of productivity of military 
spending and the burden it represents on the national economy, while public 
finances should be used to encourage national productive capacities. He denounced 
Germany's ban on keeping an army and an armaments industry, saying that these 
measures were a means of ridding the country of a considerable economic burden84. 
The growth of German exports, at the expense of other countries, such as Great 
Britain, bearing the burden of international security, will be inevitable. Keynes 
suggests that, in compensation, Germany contributes to the financing of 
peacekeeping in the world. 
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When the Second World War seemed inevitable, Keynes began to study the 
best way to finance the conflict without weakening the British economy. In a short 
paper published in 1940, How to pay for the war85, he applied the principles 
expressed in the General Theory. Public action is needed to reduce inflation, in a 
context of economic recovery due to the conflict. Keynes recommends an equal 
distribution of the financial burden between social classes, for justice and social 
peace. The economic recovery generates a large private saving, half of which must 
be levied by the tax, in order to finance the war. Additional financial needs could 
be met by delaying individual consumption, through state measures in agreement 
with trade unions, such as deferred payments. These measures could stop inflation 
by restricting purchasing power. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
After the Second World War, Keynes wrote an open letter to President 
Roosevelt86, but despite the seemingly Keynesian character of New Deal economic 
measures, there was deep dissension between the two men. If Roosevelt favoured 
social measures, he remained hostile to the organization of a state interventionism 
financed by borrowing, a solution nevertheless advocated by Keynes, to revive 
purchasing power. 
Keynes's renewed appeal to international economic solidarity after the Second 
World War was also not directly followed up: his project to control commodity 
prices was discarded, as well as that of an international currency managed by a 
global institution ensuring the equilibrium of all balances of payments through 
capital transfers from surplus countries to deficit countries. 
 
Keynes' thought was deeply nourished by his participation in international 
negotiations during the inter-world wars, in particular as adviser at the British 
Treasury. If he could perceive war as a laboratory of experimentation to test the 
validity of his theory of the effect of public stimulus spending, he can in no way be 
considered as a supporter of "military Keynesianism", i.e. the use of military 
spending as a privileged instrument of economic policy (justified notably by the 
expected technological spin-offs from military investments). Keynes was openly 
hostile to militarism and war, convinced that they were contrary to human nature. 
All his proposals for the reorganization of global governance were aimed at 
                                                          
85
 Keynes J.M. (1940), How to pay for the war. A radical plan for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
London, Macmillan. 
86
 An Open Letter to President Roosevelt John Maynard Keynes, 1933. Publishing Information.  
       Keynes, from peace through free trade to interventionism for the peace                        23      
 
ensuring the absence of international conflicts related to economic or monetary 
issues. His disappointment at the failure of international economic sanctions as an 
effective instrument of peace was great. In September 1945 he called on Europe, as 
soon as the economies were restored, to return to trade liberalism, with the help of 
the United States, for the benefit of all in the long term. Even if this may seem 
contradictory to his declarations of the 1930s in favour of a return to more self-
sufficiency, this shows precisely the primacy of his preoccupation with the 
pacification of international relations. According to him, global peace should be 
consolidated by international institutions guaranteeing the prosperity of all 
countries through interventionist measures based on the principle of international 
solidarity. 
. 
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